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Abstract
This paper endogenises the extent of intra-sectoral competition in a multi-sectoral model of oligopoly in
general equilibrium. Firms choose capacity followed by prices. If the bene￿ts of capacity investment in a
given sector are below a threshold level, the sector exhibits Bertrand behaviour, otherwise it exhibits Cournot
behaviour. By endogenising the threshold parameter in general equilibrium, we show how exogenous shocks
alter the mix of sectors between ￿more￿and ￿less￿competitive, or Bertrand and Cournot. The model also
has implications for the e⁄ects of trade liberalisation and technological change on the relative wages of skilled
and unskilled workers.
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One of the oldest themes in international economics is that larger or more open economies are likely to
be more competitive. This notion has been formalized in a variety of ways. Partial-equilibrium models of
oligopoly have shown that trade liberalization or increases in market size generate a competition e⁄ect which
reduces output and pro￿t margins of incumbent ￿rms. Krugman (1979) showed that similar e⁄ects can arise
in a general-equilibrium model with di⁄erentiated products, free entry and general demands. However, most
later models of monopolistic competition and trade have used the C.E.S. version of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences,
which implies that ￿rms￿ price-cost margins, and hence the degree of competition in the economy, are
independent of market size. Melitz (2003) introduces ￿rm heterogeneity into such a framework, and shows
that trade liberalization favours more e¢ cient ￿rms at the expense of less e¢ cient ones, but existing ￿rms
do not change their mark-ups.1 No fully satisfactory general-equilibrium model in which mark-ups and the
degree of competition are endogenous has yet been developed.
In this paper we provide a new explanation of how exogenous shocks such as growth or trade liberalisation
can lead to changes in the degree of competitive behaviour throughout the economy. We do this by embedding
a model of ￿rm behaviour along the lines of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in a framework of general
oligopolistic equilibrium presented in Neary (2002). In the model of Kreps and Scheinkman, as simpli￿ed,
and reduced to an equilibrium in pure strategies by Maggi (1996), ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated products
￿rst invest in capacity and then set their output prices. Although ￿rms always compete in a Bertrand manner
in the second stage of the game, the outcome may or may not resemble that of a one-stage Bertrand game.
It will do so if the cost savings from prior investment in capacity are below a threshold level.2 By contrast, if
the cost savings exceed the threshold, then the outcome is ￿as if￿the ￿rms were playing a one-stage Cournot
game.
All previous applications of this approach have considered only a single sector in partial equilibrium.3
Moreover, they have assumed that the crucial threshold parameter is exogenous. Our contribution is to
note that it is endogenous in general equilibrium. We assume that it consists of a ￿real￿component, which
varies across sectors, and a ￿nominal￿one, linked to economy-wide factor prices. Shocks to the equilibrium,
such as trade liberalization, a⁄ect factor prices and therefore change the mix of sectors between ￿more￿and
￿less￿competitive, or Bertrand and Cournot. The model thus suggests a new mechanism whereby exogenous
changes can a⁄ect the degree of competition in an economy. It also throws new light on the impact of trade
1Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) show that this can be relaxed in a model with a demand system similar to ours. However,
since they assume that preferences are quasi-linear they do not model the impact on factor markets.
2Strictly speaking, for any investment in capacity, the outcome is a ￿quasi-Bertrand￿one, as we explain in Section 4.
3The Kreps-Scheinkman model has been further explored by Davidson and Deneckere (1986), Friedman (1988) and Madden
(1998), and has been applied to trade issues by Venables (1990) and Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1992) as well as by Maggi.
1liberalisation and technological change on the relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers.
It is helpful to begin by considering the model in the absence of oligopolistic interaction. Section 2
examines the case of a closed economy where each of a continuum of sectors has only a single ￿rm. We
show how the decision to invest in capacity is determined and in Section 3 illustrate the determination
of equilibrium and the e⁄ects of shocks to the initial equilibrium. Section 4 extends this model to allow
for more than one ￿rm in each sector and shows how the mix between ￿Bertrand￿and ￿Cournot￿sectors
is determined. Section 4 also shows how the duopoly case can be interpreted as a two-country world, and
Section 5 explores how opening up such a world to trade a⁄ects the degree of competition and the distribution
of income.
2 Monopoly in General Equilibrium
2.1 Technology
We consider a continuum of sectors indexed by z, which varies along the unit interval: z 2 [0;1]. As already
discussed in the introduction, we assume in this section that there is a single ￿rm in each sector. Each faces
a choice between investing in capacity or not. We assume that production and capacity installation require
di⁄erent factors of production.4 Speci￿cally, following much of the empirical literature on technology, trade
and wages, we assume that the distinction between production and non-production workers coincides with
that between unskilled and skilled workers.5 (Our results are qualitatively unchanged as long as capacity
installation uses skilled labour more intensively than production.) Thus, installing capacity requires only
skilled labour: the skilled labour requirement for a unit of capacity is the same across all sectors, equal to
￿, and the skilled wage is r. As for production, it requires only unskilled labour, which is paid a wage w.
For all units up to capacity the unskilled labour requirement is ￿(z); while each unit of production above
capacity requires ￿(z) additional unskilled workers. Hence, letting q(z) and k(z) denote the levels of actual
output and capacity output in sector z, respectively, total costs can be written as:




w￿(z)q (z) if q (z) ￿ k(z)
w￿(z)q (z) + w￿(z)[q (z) ￿ k(z)] if q (z) > k(z)
(1)
4Similar assumptions have been made in models of trade under monopolistic competition. Lawrence and Spiller (1983)
distinguish between physical capital and labour (rather than skilled and unskilled labour) and assume that they are exclusively
used in ￿xed and variable costs respectively. Flam and Helpman (1987) allow for di⁄erences in factor proportions between ￿xed
costs (which they interpret as R&D costs incurred in product development) and variable costs.
5See for example Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Feenstra (2003, p. 101) and Bernard et al. (2004).
2As already noted, all sectors face the same factor prices w and r. However, they di⁄er in their technologies.
We assume that sectors vary between ￿low-tech￿and ￿hi-tech￿or ￿traditional￿and ￿modern￿ . Sectors with
low values of z are more low-tech, in that they have relatively high unskilled labour requirements ￿(z) and
relatively low penalties for producing above capacity ￿(z). Sectors with high values of z are more hi-tech
and have the opposite con￿guration. We assume that the sectors can be ordered such that ￿(z) falls (or at
least does not rise) and ￿(z) rises (or at least does not fall) monotonically with z:
￿0(z) ￿ 0 and ￿
0(z) ￿ 0 (2)
In simulations it is convenient to specialize to the case where both ￿(z) and ￿(z) are linear in z.6
2.2 Capacity Choice
When will a ￿rm invest in capacity? If it does not invest its marginal production cost is wf￿(z) + ￿(z)g;
while if it does invest its full marginal cost is w￿(z) + r￿. The latter includes the cost of a unit of capacity
r￿, equal to the skilled wage times the number of skilled workers needed to produce the unit. The bene￿t
of an extra unit of capacity is the saving of w￿(z) on the additional unit of output produced. Hence the
marginal sector ~ z which is indi⁄erent between investing in capacity and not is the solution to the equation:
r￿ = w￿(~ z) (3)
Provided we assume that ￿(z) is strictly increasing in z, this equation must have a unique solution. However,
the value of ~ z need not lie strictly between zero and one. If it does, then some sectors (those for which z > ~ z)
invest in capacity while others (those for which z ￿ ~ z) do not.7 If, instead, the value of ~ z which satis￿es (3)
lies outside these admissible bounds, then the e⁄ective value of ~ z must take on one or other boundary value.
At one extreme, if the relative cost of skilled labour is so high or extra capacity is so unproductive that r￿
exceeds w￿(z) for all z 2 [0;1], then no sectors invest in capacity and ~ z equals one. At the other extreme, if
capacity is relatively cheap so r￿ is less than w￿(z) for all z 2 [0;1], then all sectors invest in capacity and
~ z equals zero. In most of the paper we concentrate on the case where ~ z lies strictly between zero and one,
since this gives the richest set of outcomes. Other cases will be mentioned in passing.
Note the comparative statics implications of (3). Both an increase in the skill premium r=w and a fall
6Thus, ￿ (z) = ￿0 ￿ ￿1z, where ￿0 > 0, ￿1 ￿ 0 and ￿ (z) ￿ 0 for all z; and ￿ (z) = ￿0 + ￿1z, where ￿0 ￿ 0 and ￿1 ￿ 0. In
the case where both ￿0 and ￿0 are zero (corresponding to ￿1 = ￿1 = 0 when the functions are linear), all sectors are identical.
This is called the ￿featureless economy￿in Neary (2003) and will not be considered further.
7When the ￿rm is indi⁄erent (i.e., equation (3) is satis￿ed with equality), we assume that it does not invest in capacity.
3in the productivity of skilled workers (i.e., a rise in ￿) are associated with a rise in ~ z. Each of these shocks
makes investing in capacity less attractive, and so fewer sectors choose to do so in equilibrium. In this case
we can say that the extensive margin of capacity investment rises.
2.3 Preferences
Consumer preferences take a continuum quadratic form as in Neary (2002), extended to allow for di⁄er-
entiated products.8 There are ￿ L identical consumers, each with additively separable preferences over their





and a quadratic sub-utility function de￿ned over the output of each sector:




x1(z)2 + x1(z)2 + 2ex1(z)x2(z)
￿
(5)
Here xi (z) is the individual￿ s demand for variety i in sector z; and e is an inverse measure of product
di⁄erentiation, ranging from zero (the case of unrelated goods) to one (the case of identical products). To
ensure an equilibrium in pure strategies exists we assume that e is strictly less than one. In the monopoly
case, only one good is produced in each sector and so ufx(z)g is simply ax(z) ￿ b
2x(z)2.
Each individual maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint:
Z 1
0
[p1(z)x1 (z) + p2(z)x2 (z)]dz ￿ I (6)







[xi(z) + exj(z)] i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (7)
Here ￿ is the individual￿ s marginal utility of income, which depends on income and on the distribution of
prices. (Details are given in the Appendix.) Aggregating over all ￿ L individuals and imposing market clearing
(so the total quantity sold by ￿rm i in sector z, qi(z), equals ￿ Lxi(z), for all i;z) yields the market inverse
demand functions:
pi(z) = e a ￿e b[qi(z) + eqj(z)] i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (8)
8This treatment of di⁄erentiated product demand within each sector follows Dixit (1981), Vives (1985) and Ottaviano,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002).
4where e a ￿ a=￿ and e b ￿ b=￿￿ L. Because of ￿, the demand functions are highly non-linear. However, ￿ depends
only on economy-wide variables and not directly on variables in sector z. Hence, ￿rms in sector z take e a and
e b as given in their decision-making, so from the perspective of individual sectors the demand functions are
linear.
2.4 Factor markets
Assuming that wage ￿ exibility brings about full employment, equilibrium in the market for unskilled workers




[￿ (z) + ￿(z)]qM[wf￿ (z) + ￿(z)g]dz +
Z 1
~ z
￿ (z)qM[w￿ (z) + r￿]dz (9)
As already noted, ￿ L is the number of individuals, each of which is assumed to supply one unit of unskilled
labour and s units of skilled labour. This equals the aggregate demand for unskilled labour, which in turn
equals the sum over all sectors of their output, times their unskilled labour requirement per unit output.
The level of output in monopoly qM depends on the ￿rm￿ s full marginal cost and is given in the Appendix,
equation (21). Note that the unskilled labour requirement drops discontinuously at ~ z, the threshold sector
where ￿rms switch to investing in capacity.




￿qM[w￿ (z) + r￿]dz (10)
The endowment of skilled workers is s times the endowment of unskilled workers, while the demand for
skilled workers from each sector which invests in capacity equals ￿ times its output.
2.5 National Income
To complete the model we need to specify how pro￿ts are disbursed. It is convenient to assume that they
are redistributed costlessly in equal shares to each of the ￿ L individuals. National income therefore equals
the sum of factor payments and pro￿ts. In per capita terms, this is:
I = w + rs + ￿=￿ L (11)
where ￿ is the sum of pro￿ts of all ￿rms in the economy.
53 Equilibrium and Responses to Shocks
3.1 Determination of Equilibrium
The full model consists of the two labour-market equilibrium conditions, (9) and (10), with the level of
output in each sector given by (21); the equation for the threshold sector or extensive margin ~ z, (3); and
the de￿nitions of income and the marginal utility of income, (11) and (24). However, we have one degree of
freedom in solving for nominal variables: as in Neary (2002), all real variables are homogeneous of degree
zero in the nominal variables w, r and ￿
￿1. Hence we can choose an arbitrary numeraire without a⁄ecting
the model￿ s properties, and it is convenient to choose the marginal utility of income itself as numeraire,
setting ￿ equal to one.
The model can be further simpli￿ed by using (3) to eliminate r. The model can thus be reduced to two
equations in w and ~ z, which in turn can be illustrated in a single diagram as in Fig. 1.9 The properties of
these equations are derived formally in the Appendix. Here we give an intuitive account.
Consider ￿rst the equilibrium condition in the market for skilled labour, equation (10) with r￿ replaced
by w￿(~ z). The demand for skilled labour is decreasing in the unskilled wage w for two distinct reasons.
On the one hand, a rise in w raises costs directly, since skilled and unskilled labour are complements in
production in each sector that invest in capacity.10 On the other hand, a rise in w also raises costs indirectly,
by raising the skilled wage r needed to maintain the initial value of the threshold sector ~ z. The demand for
skilled labour is also decreasing in ~ z itself for similar reasons. On the one hand, an increase in ~ z reduces
the demand for skilled labour at the extensive margin, as the marginal sector ceases to invest in capacity.
On the other hand, it raises the equilibrium skilled wage r, at a given unskilled wage w, so inducing all
capacity-using sectors (those for which z > ~ z) to invest in less capacity at the intensive margin. The locus
is thus downward-sloping, as shown in Fig. 1, with points above corresponding to states of excess supply of
skilled labour.
Consider next the equilibrium condition in the market for unskilled labour, equation (9). A rise in the
unskilled wage induces all sectors to reduce their labour demand at the intensive margin, both directly and
indirectly (by raising the skilled wage). So, not surprisingly, unskilled labour demand is decreasing in the
unskilled wage. However, the e⁄ect of an increase in ~ z on unskilled labour demand is ambiguous: see equation
9It might seem that it would be simpler to eliminate ~ z rather than r. However, the slopes of the loci in the ￿gures are not so
clear-cut in that case. Where this approach becomes very useful is in the boundary case where all sectors invest in capacity so ~ z is
always zero. The model then reduces to two excess factor demand equations which exhibit gross substitutability: L = LD(w;r)
and S = SD(w;r). The comparative statics properties of this system are easily derived, and (provided ~ z remains equal to zero)
they are very similar to those of the more complex case considered in the text.
10The technology could be described as ￿putty-clay￿. (See Solow (1962) and Bliss (1968).) There is a discrete choice between
two techniques ex ante, while after capacity is installed the skilled-to-unskilled labour ratio equals ￿=￿ (z). Even the latter is
not ￿xed in the engineering sense, since ￿rms could in principle produce above or below capacity. However, in equilibrium it is
never pro￿t-maximising to do so.
6(29) in the Appendix. On the one hand, the increase in the extensive margin itself means that the marginal
sector ceases to invest in capacity, increasing its demand for unskilled labour by ￿(~ z) times its output. On
the other hand, the increase in ~ z raises the skilled wage, so reducing the demand for unskilled labour at the
intensive margin in all the capacity-using sectors. When ~ z is high, the latter e⁄ect is insigni￿cant, and so
the locus must be upward-sloping. We can characterize this as the case where the economy is skill-scarce:
relatively few sectors use skilled labour, so the e⁄ect at the extensive margin dominates, raising the demand
for unskilled labour. By contrast, for low values of ~ z, the economy is skill-abundant. Now the intensive-
margin e⁄ect of an increase in ~ z lowers the demand for unskilled labour in sectors which invest in capacity.
When this e⁄ect dominates the extensive-margin e⁄ect (which it may, though need not), the demand for
unskilled labour is reduced by an increase in ~ z and so the locus is downward-sloping. Combining these two
con￿ icting e⁄ects, the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus is likely to have a U-shape as illustrated in
Fig. 1.
The equilibrium of the economy is therefore as illustrated in Fig. 1. The two loci may intersect more
than once, but plausible stability conditions ensure that the out-of-equilibrium dynamics must be as shown
by the arrows. Hence the local con￿guration in the neighbourhood of a stable equilibrium must be as shown
by point A0.11 Alternatively, the two loci may not intersect at all for values of ~ z in the [0;1] interval. This
corresponds to an economy in which either all sectors invest in capacity, so ~ z equals zero, or no sectors invest
in capacity, so ~ z equals one. The latter case cannot be an equilibrium, since the demand for skilled labour
would fall to zero.12 The former is the case where skilled labour is extremely abundant, and as noted in
footnote 5 its properties are less interesting and are easily derived. In most of the remainder of the text we
concentrate on the case of a unique interior equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 1.
3.2 Comparative Statics
We can now consider the e⁄ects of shocks to an initial equilibrium. Consider ￿rst an increase in the size
of the economy as measured by the labour force ￿ L. Inspection of the labour-market equilibrium conditions,
(9) and (10), and the equation for output in (21) (see the Appendix), shows that this type of growth is
completely neutral. Endowments of both factors, and demands for all goods, rise in line with growth, and
so no change in the initial factor prices and threshold sectors is required. This occurs despite the fact that
11At points above the unskilled labour-market equilibrium locus, excess supply tends to reduce the unskilled wage; conversely
for points below. As for the skilled labour-market equilibrium locus, at points to the right of it there is excess supply of skilled
workers, as we have seen. This puts downward pressure on the skilled wage, which, at a given unskilled wage, encourages more
sectors to invest in capacity and so reduces the extensive margin ~ z. The converse applies for points to the left of the skilled
labour-market equilibrium locus.
12As ~ z approaches one, the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus is upward-sloping, as we have seen. Hence the value
of w on this locus at ~ z = 1 must be positive. However, the skilled-labour market equilibrium locus asymptotes to a value for
w of minus in￿nity, as the sectors which demand skilled workers disappear. Hence if s is strictly positive there cannot be an
equilibrium at ~ z = 1.
7demands are not homothetic.13 It arises because, with investment in capacity chosen endogenously, there
are no exogenous ￿xed costs in the economy. By contrast, in models with exogenous ￿xed costs, such as
Krugman (1979), growth per se leads to an increase in productivity and ￿rm size (and/or ￿rm numbers if
entry is possible). For medium- and long-run analysis it seems more plausible to assume that ￿xed costs
arise from prior investments rather than from fundamental properties of the technology.
A change in relative factor endowments is not neutral of course. Consider the e⁄ects of an increase in s, the
endowment of skilled labour. Inspecting the equilibrium loci, (9) and (10), and recalling that r￿ = w￿(e z), this
shock leaves the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus una⁄ected while it shifts downwards the skilled-
labour-market equilibrium locus. As Fig. 2 shows, the e⁄ect is to lower the extensive margin e z. As a result,
the skill premium r=w de￿nitely falls, although the unskilled wage itself may rise or fall. In the skill-scarce
economy, where the initial equilibrium is along the upward-sloping portion of the unskilled-labour-market
equilibrium locus, skilled and unskilled labour are complements in general equilibrium and the unskilled
wage falls. Fig. 2 illustrates the skill-abundant case, where skilled and unskilled labour are substitutes in
general equilibrium (despite being complements in production within each capacity-using sector) and the
unskilled wage rises.
Similar e⁄ects follow when the endowment of skilled labour rises not because of an absolute increase in
endowments but from skill upgrading of the existing labour force. This can be represented by compensating
changes in the unskilled and skilled endowment parameters ￿ and s (with ￿ initially equal to one), such that
the aggregate endowment (￿ + s) ￿ L remains constant. As in Fig. 2, an increase in the skilled endowment s
shifts the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus downwards; in addition, the fall in the unskilled endowment
￿ shifts the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus upwards. Once again, the extensive margin e z and the
skill premium r=w de￿nitely fall, but the unskilled wage may rise or fall, with the latter outcome only possible
in the skill-scarce economy.
The ￿nal shock we consider is skill-biased technological progress, which corresponds in our model to a fall
in the unskilled labour requirements ￿ (z). The details are complicated and are relegated to the Appendix,
Section 7.4, but the main points can be made using Fig. 3. From (10), the fall in costs unambiguously raises
the demand for skilled labour, so the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus shifts to the right. However,
from (9) the e⁄ect on the demand for unskilled labour is ambiguous. On the one hand, less unskilled labour
is needed per unit output, so demand falls. If this substitution e⁄ect dominates, the unskilled-labour-market
equilibrium locus shifts downwards and the new equilibrium is at a point such as A1 in Fig. 3. The e⁄ect
of skill-biased technological progress is to raise the extensive margin and the skill premium. The latter is
13As shown in Neary (2002), continuum-quadratic preferences as in (4) and (5) are a member of the Gorman polar form or
quasi-homothetic family of preferences. The implied Engel curves are straight lines, but do not pass through the origin.
8to be expected; the rise in the extensive margin may seem paradoxical (since fewer sectors now use skilled
workers) but is a natural general-equilibrium adjustment to the switch in demand from unskilled towards
skilled workers. On the other hand, the technological progress has a second e⁄ect on the demand for unskilled
labour: because production costs fall (which encourages an increase in output) and factors are complements,
the demand for unskilled workers tends to increase. If this output e⁄ect dominates, the unskilled-labour-
market equilibrium locus shifts upwards and the new equilibrium is at a point such as A2 in Fig. 3. Now
the unskilled wage de￿nitely rises, possibly by more than the skilled wage: A2 can be to the left of A0, in
which case the threshold sector falls and the skill premium is reduced by the technological progress.
4 Oligopoly
4.1 Firm Behaviour
We turn next to consider the oligopoly case. Note ￿rst that the analysis of capacity choice in Section 2
continues to apply. The decision by a ￿rm in sector z on whether or not to invest in capacity depends solely
on whether z is greater or less than the threshold ~ z. Hence, from (3), it depends solely on factor prices
and technology (summarised by ￿ and ￿(z)). In particular, it is independent of whether there are one or
many ￿rms in the sector. However, the amount of investment undertaken and the nature of the resulting
equilibrium depend crucially on the number of ￿rms and on the details of their behaviour. Here we assume
that there are two ￿rms in each sector and that they engage in a two-stage game, ￿rst choosing their levels
of capacity and then, having observed each others￿choices of capacity, choosing their prices.
The determination of equilibrium in a single sector is as described in Maggi (1996). First, note that, with
no uncertainty and no threat of entry, ￿rms will never choose to hold excess capacity in equilibrium; and
provided it is pro￿table to invest in capacity (i.e., provided z > ~ z), they will never produce less than their





0 if z ￿ ~ z
q(z) if z > ~ z
(12)
What is the optimal choice of capacity by each ￿rm? Investment in capacity lowers the cost of producing the
marginal unit of output. In addition, it serves as a commitment device, committing the ￿rm to incurring a
penalty if production exceeds capacity. (Crucial for this property is the assumption that capacity choices are
observable before decisions on prices are taken.) This commitment is stronger the greater the cost penalty
14Following Maggi, we assume that ￿rms never ￿nd it pro￿table to ration consumers. Boccard and Wauthy (2000) consider
the extra complications which arise in this case.
9￿(z). Hence, as Maggi shows, ￿rms which invest in capacity but have relatively low values of ￿(z) choose a
price equal to the equilibrium price which would be set in a one-stage Bertrand game with unit costs equal
to wf￿(z) + ￿(z)g. This unit cost is higher than the true unit cost actually incurred by ￿rms, which (since
they must pay the unit cost of investing in capacity r￿ but do not in practice incur the surcharge of ￿(z) for
producing above it) equals w￿(z) + r￿. Hence investment in capacity sustains higher prices.15
The highest price which investment can sustain is the price that would obtain in a one-stage Cournot
equilibrium with unit costs equal to w￿(z)+r￿. Hence, ￿rms in sectors with su¢ ciently high values of ￿(z)






pB[wf￿(z) + ￿(z)g] if z ￿ zC
pC[w￿(z) + r￿] if z ￿ zC
(13)
where pB(c) and pC(c) denote respectively the equilibrium prices in a symmetric one-stage Bertrand and
Cournot game, conditional on marginal costs equal to c. (Explicit expressions for these are given in the






qB[wf￿(z) + ￿(z)g] if z ￿ zC
qC[w￿(z) + r￿] if z ￿ zC
(14)





g] = pC[w￿(zC) + r￿] (15)
For the model to make sense, the threshold zC at which sectors that invest in capacity switch to behaving ￿as
if￿a one-stage Cournot game was being played should be greater than the threshold e z at which it becomes
pro￿table to invest in capacity. A convenient su¢ cient condition for this to be the case is given in the
following:
Proposition 1 A su¢ cient condition for zC to exceed e z is that H(z) ￿ ￿
0(z) + [e2=(2 + e)]￿0(z) is positive
for all z 2 [e z;zC].
(The proofs of this and subsequent results are in the Appendix.) Recall that, from (2), ￿
0(z) is non-
negative and ￿0(z) is non-positive; moreover, the coe¢ cient of ￿0(z) lies between zero (when e = 0) and one
15This result is analogous to the outcome of a one-stage Bertrand game with homogeneous products and heterogeneous costs.
In our model both ￿rms incur a marginal cost of w￿(z) + r￿ but they charge prices which re￿ect the marginal cost they would
incur if they deviated from the low-output equilibrium, wf￿(z) + ￿ (z)g. Similarly, in the one-stage Bertrand game, all ￿rms
produce zero output except the lowest-cost ￿rm. It charges a price equal, not to its own marginal cost, but to the marginal
cost of the second-lowest-cost ￿rm, since that is the price which would prevail if the lowest-cost ￿rm deviated and produced
less than equilibrium output.
10third (when e = 1). Hence the su¢ cient condition would fail only if ￿(z), the cost premium for producing
above capacity, increased in z much less rapidly than ￿ (z), the marginal cost when producing at or below
capacity, falls in z. This seems plausible, and henceforward it is convenient to assume that it holds. Provided
it holds at z = zC, we can also sign the responses of zC to changes in factor prices:
Proposition 2 The threshold Cournot sector zC is decreasing in the return to unskilled workers w and




An immediate corollary to this result follows from the fact that, recalling (3), the return to skilled
workers r is increasing in both w and e z. Hence, when r is determined endogenously in general equilibrium,
the threshold Cournot sector zC is increasing in the extensive margin e z.
4.2 Intersectoral Di⁄erences in Prices and Factor Demands
For given factor prices and threshold sectors, Fig. 4 illustrates how the equilibrium output price varies
across sectors. (To avoid distracting non-linearities, Figs. 4 and 5 use the special linear functional forms for
the technology distributions speci￿ed in footnote 2, with the added simpli￿cation that ￿1 is zero, so ￿ (z) is
independent of z.) Here and subsequently (except where otherwise speci￿ed) we assume that the equilibrium
is an interior one, so both e z and zC lie between zero and one; and that it is a well-behaved one, so zC exceeds
e z.
Sectors with z below e z in Fig. 4 are denoted ￿pure Bertrand￿sectors: here ￿rms do not invest in capacity,
and the equilibrium price is that in a standard one-stage game with marginal costs equal to wf￿ (z) + ￿(z)g.
The expression for the equilibrium price is the same in sectors with z between e z and zC, but now this price
is above the ￿pure Bertrand￿level, since the full marginal cost in this range is w￿ (z)+￿r, which is less than
wf￿ (z) + ￿(z)g. Investment in capacity sustains a higher price than the one-stage Bertrand equilibrium
price. Hence we call these ￿quasi-Bertrand￿ sectors. Finally, sectors with z above zC have the highest
sustainable price, the Cournot price corresponding to the full marginal cost w￿ (z) + ￿r.
The full employment conditions are similar to those in the monopoly case, equations (9) and (10), with two
added complications. First, factor demands di⁄er between the ￿quasi-Bertrand￿sectors (with e z < z < zC)
where the equilibrium price is lower than the Cournot price, and the ￿Cournot￿sectors (with z > zC) where
it equals the Cournot price; and, second, demands from all sectors are higher because there are now two
￿rms in each sector rather than one. Thus, the equilibrium condition in the market for unskilled labour is:
11￿ L = 2
Z ~ z
0









￿ (z)qC[w￿ (z) + r￿]dz (16)
Similarly the demand for skilled labour comes from both ￿rms in each of the ￿quasi-Bertrand￿and ￿Cournot￿
sectors:




￿qB[wf￿ (z) + ￿(z)g]dz + 2
Z 1
zC
￿qC[w￿ (z) + r￿]dz (17)
These aggregate factor demands are most easily understood by considering how they vary across sectors,
as illustrated in Fig. 5, where s(z) and l(z) denote the skilled and unskilled labour demand in sector z
respectively. Sectors with z below ~ z do not invest in capacity and so demand unskilled labour only. Their
demand for unskilled labour may either rise or fall with z: Fig. 5 illustrates the case where it falls with z.16
At z = e z, there is a discrete drop in the demand for unskilled labour and a corresponding jump in demand
for skilled labour, as sectors begin to invest in capacity. As z increases further, demand for both factors
falls, not because actual costs incurred rise, but because the penalty for producing beyond capacity rises
and so higher prices can be sustained. Finally, beyond zC, factor demands do not change further as ￿ (z) is
assumed to be independent of z in the ￿gure.
4.3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Despite the added complexities of the duopoly case, the analysis of the monopoly case continues to apply in
qualitative terms. In particular, the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to two equations in the unskilled
wage w and the extensive margin e z, and the qualitative properties of Fig. 1 are unchanged.17 The skilled-
labour-market equilibrium locus continues to be unambiguously downward-sloping, as a higher extensive
margin leads to excess supply of skilled labour, requiring a fall in the unskilled wage to restore equilibrium.
16The responsiveness of l(z) to an increase in z in pure Bertrand sectors equals ￿0(z)qB fc(z)g[1 ￿ "(z)]. Here ￿(z) ￿
￿ (z)+￿ (z) and so ￿0(z) may be either positive or negative in general, though it is positive under the special assumptions made
in Fig. 4; c(z) equals w￿(z) in this range; and "(z) ￿ ￿[c(z)=qB fc(z)g][@qB fc(z)g=@c(z)] is the elasticity of output with
respect to marginal cost, which can be greater or less than one. Hence the case illustrated in Fig. 4 corresponds to a relatively
high cost elasticity of output.
17Technically, this arises because, as a marginal sector switches from quasi-Bertrand to Cournot behaviour, its output, and
hence its factor demands, do not change. Hence the labour-market equilibrium conditions, (16) and (17), are independent of
the new variable zC, and so the Jacobian of the coe¢ cient matrix is block-triangular: the equilibrium values of ~ z, w and r are
determined by (3), (16) and (17), just as they were determined by (3), (9) and (10) in the monopoly case, while equation (15)
alone determines the equilibrium value of zC.
12In addition, the unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus continues to have a U-shape in general: a higher
extensive margin may lead to excess supply of unskilled labour when skilled labour is abundant, but must
lead to excess demand when skilled labour is scarce.
Comparative statics in the neighbourhood of an equilibrium also exhibit the same qualitative properties
as before. Thus an increase in the endowment of skilled labour always reduces the extensive margin but
has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the unskilled wage: Fig. 2 illustrates the skill-abundant case where the unskilled
wage rises. The additional feature is of course that the threshold sector for Cournot behaviour, zC, is
endogenous in general equilibrium. Hence, given the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 2, we can conclude
that the fall in the extensive margin ~ z is associated with a fall in zC in all cases. In this sense, the e⁄ect of
an increased endowment of skilled labour is to make the economy less competitive, as more sectors exhibit
Cournot behaviour.
The e⁄ects of skill-biased technological progress are also similar to the monopoly case. When the sub-
stitution e⁄ect dominates, the demand for unskilled labour falls, which raises the skill premium and makes
the economy more competitive. In duopoly both ~ z and zC increase, as fewer sectors can a⁄ord the more
expensive skilled labour which is needed to sustain higher prices. However, when the output e⁄ect domi-
nates, the demand for both types of labour rises. The change in the skill premium is now ambiguous, and a
su¢ ciently large output e⁄ect can lead it to fall. In that case both ~ z and zC fall, and the economy becomes
less competitive.
4.4 Autarky versus Free Trade
So far, we have interpreted the model as applying to a single economy only. However, the duopoly case can
also be interpreted as an integrated world economy, formed by the elimination of trade barriers between two
separate economies, each of which is identical to the monopoly case of Sections 2 and 3. To see this, note





￿qB[wf￿ (z) + ￿(z)g]dz +
Z 1
zC
￿qC[w￿ (z) + r￿]dz (18)
Compared to the corresponding condition for the closed-economy duopoly case, equation (17), the labour
demand in (18) comes from only one ￿rm in each sector rather than two. However, the goods demands facing
each sector are now greater, as free trade has increased the market size. In the case of free trade between
two identical countries, the goods demands are exactly twice the monopoly level: they are given as before by
equation (20) in the Appendix, except that the demand parameter e b, an inverse measure of market size, now
equals b=2￿￿ L instead of b=￿￿ L in the monopoly case. These two di⁄erences between closed-economy duopoly
13and symmetric free trade exactly o⁄set one another, so the equilibria are identical.18 Hence we have an
exact equivalence between two comparisons: that between monopoly and duopoly in a single country, and
that between autarky (with monopoly in each sector) and symmetric free trade.
5 Comparing Autarky and Free Trade
Next we wish to compare the equilibria with monopoly and duopoly, which as we have seen also amounts to
comparing autarky and symmetric free trade. This is a non-local comparison, so we proceed in a series of
steps.19
Note ￿rst the e⁄ects of moving from autarky to free trade in those sectors which do not invest in capacity
in autarky (i.e., those with z < ~ zA). On the one hand, they clearly increase their demand for unskilled labour
at initial wages as the number of ￿rms rises. On the other hand, since there is no demand for skilled labour
from these sectors, there is no change in the demand for skilled labour at initial wages. This asymmetric
change in factor demands by itself tends to raise the unskilled wage as the economy moves from autarky
to free trade. A higher unskilled wage in turn encourages more sectors to invest in capacity, so both the
extensive margin and the skill premium fall. In a skill-scarce economy, these sectors dominate: ~ zA is close
to one and so the primary impact of moving to free trade is to raise the skill premium. This result is
straightforward, but for completeness we state it formally:
Proposition 3 In a skill-scarce economy, where ~ zA is close to one, a move from autarky to free trade leads
to an increase in the unskilled wage, and a decrease in both the extensive margin and the skill premium.
(The proof is immediate.)
Next, we show that the e⁄ect highlighted in Proposition 3 also dominates in the special case where
variable costs are the same in all sectors, provided only that ~ zA is strictly positive:
Proposition 4 When ￿(z) is independent of z, and ~ zA is strictly positive, a move from autarky to free trade
leads to an increase in the unskilled wage, and a decrease in both the extensive margin and the skill premium.
The proof (in the Appendix) is complex but can be explained intuitively with the help of Fig. 6. With
increased competition, the demand for both factors rises in the move from monopoly to duopoly. Hence the
unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus shifts upwards and the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus
shifts rightwards as shown. To prove the proposition we need to show that the vertical shift in the L locus
18Necessary conditions for this property are that demands are linear, there are no exogenous ￿xed costs, and the number of
countries in symmetric free trade is the same as the number of ￿rms in closed-economy oligopoly.
19Henceforward we use superscripts ￿A￿and ￿F￿to denote autarky (monopoly) and symmetric free trade (duopoly) respec-
tively.
14is greater than that in the S locus. Let wS denote the new unskilled wage rate which is just su¢ cient to
re-establish equilibrium on the market for skilled labour without any change in the extensive margin ~ z. Hence
point AS, with an unskilled wage equal to wS and a threshold sector equal to the monopoly level ~ zA, lies
on the duopoly skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus, and we need to show that it lies below the duopoly
unskilled-labour-market equilibrium locus. Because ￿ (z) is independent of z, the increase in w to wS exactly
o⁄sets the e⁄ect of extra competition in raising demand for unskilled labour from the capacity-using sectors.
But the remaining sectors (those with z < ~ z) are unskilled-labour-intensive, both on average and at the
margin, precisely because they do not invest in capacity. Hence this increase in w is not su¢ cient to choke
o⁄ their extra demand for unskilled labour, and the unskilled wage must rise by more, to the level denoted
wF in the ￿gure, to clear both markets. As a result, the new equilibrium is at AF, where the threshold
sector ~ z and the skill premium are lower in free trade relative to autarky.
Consider next the case where variable costs are strictly decreasing in z. Now the factor intensity di⁄erences
across sectors work in the opposite direction to Proposition 4: the increased market size tends to encourage
disproportionally the expansion of sectors which invest in capacity in autarky, increasing the relative demand
for skilled labour, which in turn tends to raise the skill premium. This e⁄ect is most likely to dominate in
a skill-abundant economy, where relatively few sectors use only unskilled labour in autarky; and in an
economy where ￿rms face little competition, so their factor demands expand to take full advantage of the
larger market. Carrying both these e⁄ects to their extremes, we can state a formal set of conditions which
ensure an increase in the skill premium:
Proposition 5 When ￿(z) is strictly decreasing in z, e equals zero, and exogenous parameters are such that
~ zA is zero, then a move from autarky to free trade increases both the extensive margin and the skill premium.
Formally, the proof proceeds in a similar way to that of Proposition 4, except that now there is excess
supply of unskilled labour at the autarky threshold sector (~ zA = 0) and at the wage wS just su¢ cient to
choke o⁄ excess demand for skilled labour.
The results of Propositions 4 and 5 are summarised in Fig. 7. Here we specialise to the case of a linear
distribution of technology parameters, so ￿ (z) = ￿0 ￿￿1z. The vertical axis plots ￿1, which is a measure of
intersectoral di⁄erences in factor intensity (speci￿cally, in the unskilled labour requirement per unit output).
The horizontal axis plots e, which is a measure of the intensity of competition within sectors. We have seen
from Proposition 4 that, when all sectors have the same unskilled labour requirements (so ￿1 is zero), free
trade leads capacity￿ using sectors to raise their demands for both factors in equal proportions. Provided
there are some sectors in autarky which do not use capacity, their increased relative demand for unskilled
labour therefore dominates the move from autarky to free trade and induces a fall in the skill premium.
15Hence Proposition 4 tells us that, at points along the horizontal axis in Fig. 7, free trade leads to a lower
skill premium. As for Proposition 5, it considers the case where e is zero, so the move from autarky to free
trade does not expose ￿rms to extra competition but only has a market size e⁄ect, which encourages a large
increase in output by all ￿rms. When all sectors use skilled labour in autarky and ￿1 is strictly positive,
this e⁄ect encourages a larger relative increase in the demand for skilled labour. Hence, Proposition 5 tells
us that at points along the vertical axis free trade leads to a higher skill premium.
The locus in the interior of Fig. 7, based on simulations for the linear case, shows combinations of ￿1 and
e which yield no change in the skill premium and the extensive margin between autarky and free trade.20
Thus a rise in the skill premium and the extensive margin is encouraged by greater di⁄erences in factor
intensity between sectors, and by less intense competition within sectors.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented a new model which integrates some key features of industrial organisation and
general-equilibrium trade theory, and highlights a new mechanism whereby relative wages and the nature of
competition within sectors are a⁄ected by exogenous shocks. The model extends to general equilibrium the
work of Maggi (1996), which predicts that ￿rms will exhibit Bertrand or Cournot behaviour depending on the
costs of investing in capacity, where capacity serves as a commitment device to sustain higher prices. Maggi
looked at normative questions only. In particular, he showed that the Kreps-Scheinkman approach resolves
the apparent con￿ ict between Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), who proved
respectively that the optimal export subsidy is positive in Cournot competition and negative in Bertrand
competition.21 Here we have focused instead on positive questions, including the e⁄ects of exogenous shocks
such as changes in relative factor endowments and trade liberalisation on the distribution of income and on
the margin between more and less competitive sectors.
Of course, trade liberalisation leads directly to more competition when the number of ￿rms in each
sector rises. However, just how much more competition is induced depends on whether ￿rms are able to
sustain prices above the Bertrand level. Our model shows that this in turn depends both on technology
and on factor prices, with the latter determined endogenously in general equilibrium. When sectors di⁄er
in their requirements of unskilled labour, and when goods are more di⁄erentiated within sectors so inter-
￿rm competition is less intense, trade between similar economies raises the relative return to skilled labour,
making it more di¢ cult to sustain higher prices through investment in capacity and so leading to greater
20The parameter values underlying the simulation are: s=0.99; b=10; ￿0=1; ￿0=0; ￿1=1; a=100; L=45.
21An obvious extension of the present paper would be to consider optimal trade and industrial policy. This would qualify
Maggi￿ s results by adding general-equilibrium e⁄ects similar to those considered by Dixit and Grossman (1986).
16competition throughout the economy.
The model also exhibits other novel features. It shows that the e⁄ects of exogenous shocks to factor
endowments and technology di⁄er greatly depending on whether the economy is skill-abundant or not. And,
although preferences are non-homothetic and ￿xed costs play an important role, the fact that the ￿xed costs
are endogenous implies that the economy exhibits constant returns to scale in the aggregate, in striking
contrast to models with exogenous ￿xed costs. More work is needed to explore the robustness of these and
other properties of the model to alternative speci￿cations of the workings of factor markets and the ways in
which technology and factor prices interact to a⁄ect the nature of competition between ￿rms.
177 Appendix
7.1 Bertrand, Cournot and Monopoly Equilibria
Given the market inverse demand functions (8), and letting c denote the marginal production cost, routine
calculations show that the prices and outputs in Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are as follows:
pB(c) =
e a(1 ￿ e) + c
2 ￿ e
and pC(c) =




e a ￿ c
e b(1 + e)(2 ￿ e)
and qC(c) =
e a ￿ c
e b(2 + e)
(20)
As for the price and output in monopoly, they equal the values in both Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium
when e equals zero:
pM(c) =
e a + c
2
and qM(c) =
e a ￿ c
2e b
(21)
7.2 Derivation of the Marginal Utility of Income
An individual￿ s marginal utility of income with continuum quadratic preferences and homogeneous products
in each sector is derived in Neary (2002). With di⁄erentiated products, the steps are similar. First invert
the individual inverse demand functions (7) to get the direct demand functions:
xi(z) = ￿ ￿ ￿￿[pi(z) ￿ epj(z)] i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (22)








Now multiply the direct demand functions for goods i and j in sector z by pi(z) and pj(z) respectively, add
to get the individual￿ s expenditure on both goods in that sector, and integrate over all sectors to get her









p denote respectively the ￿rst and second moments of the distribution of prices and ￿p denotes
















When prices are the same in all sectors, ￿p reduces to ￿2
p. Note, however, that we cannot take the limit of
(24) as e approaches 1, since the inverse demand functions cannot be inverted in this case. The value of ￿
when e equals 1 can instead be calculated directly by integrating over the inverse demand functions times
the corresponding prices as in Neary (2002).
7.3 Properties of the Equilibrium Loci
Consider ￿rst the monopoly or autarky equilibrium of Sections 2 and 3. Write the equilibrium condition for
the skilled-labour-market, equation (10), as s￿ L = SM(w;r;e z), with r determined by (3). The derivative of
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dz < 0 (26)


















dz < 0 (27)
Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the unskilled-labour-market, equation (9), can be written as ￿ L =
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dz < 0 (28)


















dz ? 0 (29)
19Consider next the duopoly or free-trade case of Sections 4 and 5. As before, write the equilibrium
condition for the skilled-labour market, equation (17), as s￿ L = SD(w;r;e z), with r determined by (3). The
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dz < 0 (31)
Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the unskilled-labour market, equation (16), can be written as ￿ L =
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dz ? 0 (33)
7.4 E⁄ects of Skill-Biased Technological Progress
The simplest way to model skill-biased technological progress is to assume that the unskilled-labour coe¢ cient
￿ (z) falls by a uniform absolute amount in all sectors. Thus, rewrite ￿ (z) as ￿0 +￿ (z), where ￿0 is initially
zero, and consider the e⁄ects of a fall in ￿0, evaluated at the initial equilibrium. Di⁄erentiating the skilled-
labour demand from (10), substituting the level of monopoly output from (21), gives:
@SM
@￿0




This is unambiguous: skill-biased technological progress (i.e., a fall in ￿0) raises the demand for skilled
labour. As for the demand for unskilled labour, di⁄erentiating the right-hand side of (9) and evaluating it
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20This is ambiguous in sign, re￿ ecting two con￿ icting e⁄ects of skill-biased technological progress on the
demand for unskilled labour. On the one hand, less unskilled labour is needed per unit output, so demand
falls. (This e⁄ect, which we can call the ￿normal￿case, is represented by the ￿rst two terms on the right-hand
side of (35).) On the other hand, and more surprisingly, the fall in production costs raises the demand for
unskilled as well as skilled workers (because factors are complements in our model in equilibrium). (This
e⁄ect is represented by the third term on the right-hand side of (35).)



























The latter re￿ ects the relative slopes of the two loci, and, as argued in the previous sub-section, it must
be positive on stability grounds. Hence equation (36) implies that d~ z
d￿0 will be negative in the normal case
where skill-biased technological progress reduces the demand for unskilled labour at the initial equilibrium.
However, if the cross-e⁄ect dominates, so the demand for unskilled labour rises (shifting the ￿ L locus upwards
in Fig. 3), then skill-biased technological progress can lead paradoxically to a fall in the threshold sector
and hence in the skill premium.
7.5 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
To prove the propositions, de￿ne the following function:
￿(z) ￿ pC[w￿(z) + r￿] ￿ pB[wf￿(z) + ￿(z)g] (38)
This equals the di⁄erence between the Cournot and Bertrand prices evaluated at an arbitrary z. From
equation (15) which de￿nes zC, we know that ￿(zC) = 0. As for ~ z, we know from (3) that the arguments of
pC and pB in (38) are equal at z = ~ z. We also know from (19) that the Cournot equilibrium price exceeds
the Bertrand equilibrium price for all c; provided e is strictly positive:
pC(c) ￿ pB(c) =
e2(e a ￿ c)
4 ￿ e2 (39)
Hence it follows that ￿(~ z) > 0.
21Given that ￿(zC) = 0 and ￿(~ z) > 0, a su¢ cient condition for zC to exceed ~ z is that ￿ is decreasing in












Hence a su¢ cient condition for zC to exceed ~ z is that H(z) is positive at every point in the range [zC, ~ z].
This proves Proposition 1.
To prove Proposition 2, totally di⁄erentiate (38). From this we can conclude that, when H(zC) is positive
and so from (40) ￿z(zC) is negative, zC is decreasing in w if and only if ￿ is decreasing in w. This is easily







[￿(z) + ￿(z)] = ￿
e2￿(z) + (2 + e)￿(z)
4 ￿ e2 < 0 (41)








Hence zC is decreasing in w and increasing in r if and only if H(zC) is positive.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Denote the equilibrium wage and extensive margin in the autarky equilibrium by wA and ~ zA respectively.
In the autarky equilibrium where we assume that ￿(z) is independent of z, so ￿(z) = ￿0 for all z, the







g]dz = SM ￿
wA; ~ zA￿
(43)
Now, consider the move to free trade. Hold the extensive margin ￿xed at the autarky equilibrium level ~ zA,
and assume that the unskilled wage needed to restore equilibrium on the skilled labour market is given by











g]dz = SD ￿
wS; ~ zA￿
(44)
Since the increase in the number of ￿rms raises the demand for skilled labour in every sector, we have that
wS > wA.
22Consider next the market for unskilled workers. In the free trade case, the equilibrium condition for this












Using the equilibrium condition in the market for skilled workers from equation (43), the second integral can










f￿0 + ￿(z)gqM[wAf￿0 + ￿(z)g]dz = LM1 ￿
wA; ~ zA￿
(46)
where LM1 (:) denotes the autarky demand for unskilled workers from those sectors which do not invest in
capacity. (Note that ￿ > s￿0 is necessary for an interior equilibrium with ~ zA > 0.) Similarly, in free trade,





f￿0 + ￿(z)gqB[wSf￿0 + ￿(z)g]dz = LD1 ￿
wS; ~ zA￿
(47)
where LD1 (:) denotes the free trade demand for unskilled workers from those sectors which do not invest in




is positive, so there
is excess demand for unskilled labour at wS and ~ zA. When this is the case, the move from autarky to free
trade will lead to an unskilled wage greater than wS and a threshold sector ~ z lower than ~ zA, as in Fig. 6.
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dz (48)




2qB[wSf￿0 + ￿(z)g] > qM[wAf￿0 + ￿(z)g] (49)
Substituting from the expressions for output in (20) and (21), this is equivalent to:
￿(z) ￿
~ a ￿ wAf￿0 + ￿(z)g





where ￿ ￿ (2 ￿ e)(1 + e).












~ a ￿ wAf￿0 + ￿(z)g
￿







[~ a ￿ wSf￿0 + ￿(z)g]
2 > 0 (51)
since ￿
0 (z) > 0 and wS > wA.
De￿ne a new function which gives the demand for skilled labour in the hypothetical situation where the
equilibrium in all capacity-using sectors is as if ￿rms behave in a Bertrand manner facing the true production
cost w(￿0 + r￿) = wf￿0 + ￿(~ z)g:
SD
0
(w; ~ z) ￿ 2
Z 1
~ z
qB[wf￿0 + ￿(~ z)g]dz





(w; ~ z) overestimates the
demand for skilled workers relative to SD (w; ~ z) for all values of w and ~ z, since it assumes a a lower production
cost in those sectors for which ~ z < z < zC and a Bertrand rather than a Cournot outcome in those sectors









since both are equal to s￿ L by construction. Substituting once again from the expressions for output in (20)
and (21), this implies:






















This, together with (51), means that (50) holds for all z 2
￿
0; ~ zA￿
, which proves the proposition.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof makes use of the following lemma:
Lemma: Given Q(z) such that Q0 > 0, ￿ (z) ￿ 0 such that ￿0 < 0, and
R b
a Q(z)dz = 0, then
R b
a ￿ (z)Q(z)dz < 0.
Proof : Since Q(z) is monotonically increasing in z and
R b
a Q(z)dz = 0, there must exist a zQ 2]a;b[ such
24that Q(z) < 0 for z < zQ, Q(z) = 0 for z = zQ, and Q(z) > 0 for z > zQ. We can therefore split the integral









G(z) > 1 for z < zQ, G(z) = 1 for z = zQ, and G(z) < 1 for z > zQ. It follows that
R z
Q
a G(z)Q(z)dz < ￿A
and
R b
zQ G(z)Q(z)dz < A. Hence:
Z b
a














[￿A + A] = 0 (54)
Q.E.D.
The proof of Proposition 5 now proceeds in the same way as that of Proposition 4, with two key di⁄erences.
First, we wish to show that there is excess supply of (not excess demand for) unskilled labour at wS and
~ zA. Second, the additional assumption that e = 0 implies from (20) and (21) that qB (c) = qC (c) = 2qM (c)
(recalling that ~ b in free trade is twice the autarky level); and that zC = ~ z. With these assumptions equation
(44) which de￿nes wS becomes:
s￿ L = 2
Z 1
~ zA
￿qM[wSf￿ (z) + ￿
￿
~ zA￿
g]dz = SD ￿
wS; ~ zA￿
(55)
Equating this to the skilled-labour-market equilibrium locus in autarky, equation (10), yields
R 1
~ zA Q(z)dz = 0,
where:
Q(z) ￿ 2￿qM[wSf￿ (z) + ￿
￿
~ zA￿
g] ￿ ￿qM[wA ￿










￿0 > 0 (57)
so Q(z) satis￿es the restrictions of the Lemma.
Next, consider the unskilled labour market. The equilibrium locus in autarky is given by (9). In free










Hence the excess demand for unskilled labour at wS and ~ zA equals:
LD ￿
wS; ~ zA￿




25Invoking the Lemma shows that this is negative, which proves the proposition.
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28Fig. 1:  Simultaneous Determination of the Unskilled Wage









Fig. 2:  Effects of an Increase in the






















Fig. 4: Distribution of  Prices across Sectors
at Given Factor Prices; γ γ γ γ1 =0, θ θ θ θ1 >0.
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pB[wγ γ γ γ(z)+rδ δ δ δ]Fig. 5:  Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Labour
across Sectors at Given Factor Prices; γ γ γ γ1 =0, θ θ θ θ1 >0.
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Fig. 6:  Autarky and Free Trade Equilibria














AFFig. 7: Autarky versus Free Trade
γ γ γ γ1: Intersectoral differences in factor intensity
e:  Intrasectoral intensity of competition
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